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In the Supretne Court of the
State of Utah
HARRY CHILD, also known as
HENRY CHILD,
Respondent,
-vs-

Case No. 8869

EUGENE A. CHILD and
ARVILLA CHILD, his wife,
Appella.nts.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent calls attention to the fact that markings
have been made in many places throughout the transcript
of the trial, and asks that no unusual weight be ascribed
by the Court to the passages so marked. They are not
respondent's markings.
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Because appellants have set forth many conflicts in
the evidence in their statement of facts, respondent considers it desirable to set forth the facts found to be true
by the trial court.
Respondent commenced this action July 18, 1956,
to compel reconveyance to him of certain real property
near Bountiful, Utah, referred to in the findings as
((property A," consisting of 19.26 acres. Trial was had in
the District Court of the Honorable Charles G. Cowley,
J., sitting without jury, on June 14, 1957. The trial court
found the issues for the respondent on his second cause of
action and entered judgment thereupon on March 4, 1958.
Appellant Eugene A. Child is a son of the respondent
and Hazel Marie Child, who was the wife of respondent
until divorced in December, 1955. Until the divorce,
respondent owned and resided upon approximately nine
acres of farm land near Bountiful, Utah, known in the
Findings as uproperty B." Property uA" is near property
uB," is higher in elevation, and is accurately described in
the Findings.
Respondent became interested in buying property
uA" for his use in storing water and grazing livestock, and
in approximately 1941 he searched out the owner and
after investigating the value of the tract negotiated for
its purchase through R. 0. Warnock of Salt Lake City
(Tr. 6, 7, 8, 9). His offer of $15.00 per acre was rejected
by Mrs. Griffiths, the owner at the time.
Early in 1945 respondent learned of the death of Mrs.
Griffiths and again contacted Mr. Warnock in an effort
to purchase property uA" (Tr. 9), at which time Mr.
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Warnock, acting for lone Griffiths Rankin, the succeeding
owner, offered to sell property ccA" to respondent for
$300.00 because of his prior interest therein (Tr. 11).
Respondent immediately, on this occasion, accepted the
offer and made a down-payment of $25.00 to Mr. Warnock, the balance of the purchase price in the amount
of $275.00 to be paid to Mr. Warnock upon delivery of
the deed from lone Rankin in California conveying title
to respondent (Tr. 11).
Immediately thereafter respondent applied to the
Bountiful State Bank for a loan of $275.00 to pay the
balance due on the property. The bank approved the loan
on condition that respondent deposit his water stock as
security therefor (Tr. 12).
Respondent's water stock was at the time in the bank
safety deposit box of his wife, Hazel Child, who, with full
knowledge of respondent's intended use of the water stock
and the proceeds of the anticipated loan from the bank,
refused to surrender the water stock to respondent upon
his request therefor (Tr. 12, 13) in order to force him to
sell cows to get the money (Tr. 70). The evidence indicates that Hazel Child objected to respondent's efforts
to build up a dairy herd (Tr. 24, 47-48, 69, 70, 75, 77,
79) . There was also evidence that she tried a number of
times to sell respondent's cows (Tr. 74). Hazel's response to respondent's request for the water stock was,
((Sell some of your cows" (Tr. 13, 24, 40).
Hazel testified that the sale of two cows would have
brought enough to pay the balance of $275.00 due on
property uA" (Tr. 40), but she also admitted that at
about that same time (while Eugene was away in the
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service) she had sold one of tespondent's cows for $25.00
(Tr. 59, 80). Respondent testified that he had only 5 or
6 cows and none that he wanted to sell (Tr. 13, 24), and
that two cows would not have brought enough money
(Tr. 24).
Being thus obstructed by Hazel Chad from obtaining
a loan from the bank, respondent requested of Hazel a
loan of $275.00 from a joint bank savings account held
in the names Hazel Child and Eugene Child (Tr. 13).
Hazel wrote to Eugene, who was then eighteen years of
age (Tr. 20, 89) and stationed away from Utah in the
Navy, for his permission to grant respondent the loan. In
time, Hazel received a reply from Eugene and informed
respondent that Eugene would grant the loan on condition
that title to property uA" be placed in his name to secure
the loan (Tr. 23, 24).
Respondent did not receive, see, or read Eugene's
reply to Hazel (Tr. 14, 23), but relied solely upon the
representations of Hazel as to its contents.
On or about April 16, 1945, Hazel withdrew money
from the joint bank savings account of Hazel and Eugene
Child in Bountiful and drove with respondent to Salt
Lake City, where she delivered $275.00 (Tr. 14) to respondent only after he got out of the car and after first
exacting an express promise from him that he would put
title to property uA" in the name of Eugene Child to
secure Eugene the repayment of the loan (Tr. 15).
This $275.00 was intended and received by respondent
(Tr. 25, 108), and delivered by Hazel for Eugene, as a
loan (Finding No. 15). This $275.00 was the only money
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paid to respondent by Hazel or Eugene in connection with
this loan (Tr. 107), and respondent did not receive from
Hazel or Eugene any reimbursement of his $25.00 down
payment (Tr. 55).
After receiving the $275.00 from Hazel, respondent
went alone to the office of Mr. Warnock in the Kearns
Building in Salt Lake City and gave him the $275.00 in
return for a deed conveying title to property HA" from
lone Griffiths Rankin to respondent (Tr. 16). This
deed is in evidence, and is dated April 10, 1945, reciting
$300.00 as consideration.
Property teA" was purchased by respondent for his
sole benefit (Tr. 108, Finding No. 19).
During this time, Eugene had no knowledge of the
availability of property teA" nor of its location or value
(Tr. 97). Eugene did not purchase nor negotiate for
the purchase of this property (Tr. 81).
After he purchased the property, respondent went
with Hazel Child to the office of Toronto Real Estate Co.
in Salt Lake City on April 16, 1945, and there executed a
deed placing title to property HA" in Eugene's name in
fulfillment of his promise (Tr. 17). Respondent executed this deed for the sole purpose of securing Eugene's
loan to him and for no other consideration, and no money
was paid to respondent for this deed (Tr. 18, Finding No.
21). Respondent ·Conveyed title to Eugene as security
for the loan, and intended that Eugene hold title for respondent in trust, to be reconveyed upon payment of the
loan (Finding No. 22) .
Respondent retained both deeds, and recorded them
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in the office of the Davis County Recorder on June 6,
1945.
Ever since he purchased property nA," and through
the date this action was :filed, respondent has enjoyed uninterrupted possession and use of property ccA" (Tr. 21,
100, 101).
From the time he purchased it and ever since, respondent has at all times unequivocally claimed ownership of property nA" (Tr. 22, 31, 42, 82, 99), has at no
time agreed or intended that Eugene have the beneficial
ownership thereto (Tr. 31, 108), and has at all times denied
appellants' claim of ownership (Tr. 31, 42, 82}.
After he bought property uA," respondent procured
and paid for a land survey thereof (Tr. 18} and an abstract of title thereon (Tr. 20, 21, 96}. At his sole expense (Tr. 20, 93, 94) in an amount exceeding $200.00
(Tr. 116) and virtually his sole effort (Tr. 20, 93),
respondent constructed for his sole benefit a substantial
fence enclosing property nA" (Tr. 18, 19}. From the
date of his purchase until the filing of this action respondent continuously and uninterruptedly pastured livestock on the property (Tr. 21) .
Respondent paid taxes on the property for 1945 and
1946 (Tr. 20, 26), and Eugene paid the taxes thereon from
1947 to 1956 in the total amount of $172.41.
Appellants have at no time objected to the respondent's use, occupation, and enjoyment of property
nA" though this use, occupation, and enjoyment have been
open and known to appellants (Tr. 84).
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After the return of Eugene from the service in 1946,
respondent requested reconveyance to him of title to the
property (Tr. 21, 82, 99) upon repayment of the loan
(Tr. 25, 113), but Eugene refused to reconvey or to discuss the matter (Tr. 22, 25, 27, 30, 35), and has persisted
in his refusal to discuss the matter with respondent (Tr.
22) . Respondent has tendered repayment of the loan
with interest and demanded reconveyance from Eugene,
but the tender was refused and Eugene refused to reconvey the property.
Without respondent's permission and over his express
objections, Eugene removed soil from both property ((A"
and property .. B" (Tr. 33, 101, 113). His profit from
the soil from property ''A" was $600.00. Prior to the
filing of this action and without the knowledge or consent
of respondent, appellants encumbered property ''A" with
two mortgages.
In order to avoid conflict and division within his
family and to encourage unity therein, respondent in the
hope and with the expectation of persuading appellants
to reconvey property ''A" to him delayed bringing an
action at law to compel reconveyance (Tr. 35).
Respondent initiated this action to protect his rights
and compel reconveyance following the divorce action
by Hazel Child and in order to prevent the sale or disposal of property ''A" and because of the interference by
Eugene Child with respondent's possession and enjoyment
of said property by destruction of respondent's fence.
Shortly before this suit, the property became subject to
condemnation proceedings (Tr. 96).
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
A. FINDING NUMBER 12 IS FULLY SUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE.
B. THE LOWER COURT MADE NO SUCH FINDINGS OR CONCLUSIONS AS THOSE STATED
IN POINTS ONE AND TWO OF APPELLANTS'
BRIEF.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE IS FULLY SUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT THE FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT OF
THE COURT BELOW.
POINT III
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS THAT THE
AMOUNT OF THE LOAN WAS $275.00 FIND AMPLE SUPPORT IN THE EVIDENCE.
POINT IV
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW TI-IAT THERE WAS
A BREACH OF A CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN RESPONDENT AND HAZEL AND EUGENE CHILD ARE WITHIN THE ISSUES AND ARE
ADEQUATELY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
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POINT V
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW NO. 6 AND NO. 7
ARE WITHIN THE ISSUES OF THE CASE AND ARE
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
POINT VI
RESPONDENT'S RECOVERY IS NOT BARRED
BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS NOR BY
LACHES.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
A. FINDING NUMBER 12 IS FULLY SUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE.
B. THE LOWER COURT MADE NO SUCH FINDINGS OR CONCLUSIONS AS THOSE STATED
IN POINTS ONE AND TWO OF APPELLANTS'
BRIEF.

A.
Finding No. 12 that respondent was informed by
Hazel Child that Eugene Child agreed to grant plaintiff a
loan on condition that title to the property in question be
placed in the name of Eugene Child to secure the loan
finds ample support in the evidence during the crossexamination of respondent by appellants' attorney, Tr.
23:

((Q. Did Mrs. Child ever tell you what was in the
letter?
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A. I don't recall her telling me what was in the
letter other than that Eugene would loan me
the money on the condition that I put the
property in his name to secure the loan. That
was my understanding of what was in the
letter."
Also, Tr. 24 (bottom of page):
u • • • She told me she would let me have that
money if I would put it in Eugene's name to secure
the loan so Eugene would be sure to get his money
back."
This testimony
No. 12.

IS

plainly a sufficient basis for Finding

B.
In their points one and two, and the argument in
support thereof, appellants complain of a finding that
Eugene Child agreed to grant a loan, findings that the
deed was an equitable mortgage, and a conclusion of law
entered upon these findings. The respondent respectfully points out that the record does not contain the
findings and conclusion mentioned by appellants in their
points one and two.
Appellants do not refer by number to the findings
and conclusion to which they object, except for a reference on page 33 of their brief to Finding No. 12. The
record, p. 27, reveals that Finding No. 12 states that,
u • • • Hazel Marie Child ... informed the plaintiff that ...
Eugene A. Child expressed a willingness to grant plaintiff
the loan upon the condition that the title to the property
... be placed in the name of Eugene A. Child to secure
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11
the loan." (Emphasis added.) This is, of course, a different finding from that mentioned by appellants in their
point one.

It would appear that appellants, in points one and
two, have set themselves up ustraw men" and then proceeded to demolish them in their argument.
The burden of a considerable part of the argument
of appellants under their points 1 and 2 is that the trial
court found and concluded that the deed to property
uA" executed by plaintiff to defendant Eugene A. Child
is an equitable mortgage; that a deed can be given construction as an equitable mortgage only on the basis of a
finding of fact that both parties to the deed so intended
it; and that there was insufficient or no competent evidence adduced at the trial showing that defendant Eugene
Child intended the deed to be a mortgage. The plaintiff
takes issue with these arguments; but we here point out
that this entire line of argument is fruitless and pointless
in connection with the present appellate proceedings, inasmuch as there is no finding anywhere in the record, nor
any conclusion of law, that the deed conveying title to
property uA" constitutes an equitable mortgage. The
Court will notice that plaintiff's theory of equitable mortgage was pleaded under the first cause of action of his
complaint, but that the trial court, by minute entry (R.
12), expressly found the issues in favor of the plaintiff
under his second cause of action and issued judgment
thereupon.
We therefore suggest that appellants' argument under
their points 1 and 2 pertaining to equitable mortgages is
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irrelevant and immaterial to the case before the Court,
and should be disregarded.

POINT II
THE EVIDENCE IS FULLY SUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT THE FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT OF
THE COURT BELOW.
In their brief, appellants have much to say about the
sufficiency of the evidence, and the respondent considers
it desirable at this point to consider in a general way the
evidence adduced at the trial, together with authorities, in
answer to appellants.
Appellants quote in their brief from N orthcrest, Inc.,
v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., et al. (1952), 122 U. 268,
248 P.2d 692, 698, and we feel the quotation would be
more helpful to the Court if more fully given:
uFor evidence to be clear and convincing it
must be such that there is no serious or substantial
doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion.
Greener v. Greener, Utah, 212 P.2d 194. The evidence so satisfied the mi11d of the trial court. His
finding should not be disturbed unless we must say
that no one could reasonably find the evidence to
be clear and convincing. ..."
(Emphasis added.)
A leading Utah case relative to the sufficiency of the
evidence in ·Cases such as the present one is Stanley v. Stanley (1939), 97 U. 520, 94 P.2d 465, 466, which states
that,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ccThe scope of the review on appeal in equity
cases is clearly settled in this jurisdiction. (This
court is authorized by the state Constitution to review the findings of the trial courts in equity cases,
but the findings of the trial courts on conflicting
evidence will not be set aside unless it manifestly
appears that the court has misapplied proven facts
or made findings clearly against the weight of the
evidence.' Olivero v, Eleganti, 61 Utah 475, 214 P.
313, 315."
The Stanley case has been cited and followed in many
cases, including Perry v. McConkie (1953), 1 U.2d 189,
264 P.2d 852, and Haws v. Jensen (1949), 116 U. 212,
209 P.2d 229, both of which are of interest relative to the
present case.
This Court recently said in a similar case, Toombs v.
Toombs ( 1958), 7 U.2d 256, 322 P.2d 405, that,
((The trial court having found in favor of respondents and their being sufficient evidence to
sustain such a finding and the evidence and circumstances not being such as to require a different
finding, this court will not reverse."
In their comments regarding the evidence, the appellants fail to recognize that the trial judge resolved con:flicting issues of fact in favor of the respondent and against
appellants.
In IX Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd ed., sec. 2498, p.
327, this eminent authority quotes the following:
cc (There is no measure of the weight of evidence ( unles the witnesses on the evidential facts
are counted) other than the feeling of probability
which it engenders.' " (Emphasis the author's.)
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And on pp. 334, 335 of the same volume and section we
find,
((The application of the phrase (preponderance
of evidence' is apt to lead the judicial discussion
close to the danger line of the fallacious quantitative or numerical theory of testimony. . . . Although that theory has been generally repudiated
in our law, yet there is often a lurking recurren~e
to it in the statement that an uncontradicted witness must be believed, i.e. his testimony constitutes
(per se' a preponderance. The unsoundness of this
conception has already been noticed. . . ."
In vol. VII of the same work, sec. 2033, p. 255, the author
states,
u • • • The probative value of a witness' assertion is utterly incapable of being measure (sic) by
arithmetic. All the considerations which operate
to discredit testimony affect it in such varying ways
for different witnesses that the net trustworthiness
of each one's testimony is not to be estimated, either
in itself or in reference to others' testimony, by any
uniform numerical standard. Probative effects are
too elusive and intangible for that. The personal
element behind the assertion is the vital one, and is
too multifarious to be measured by rule. (Testimony,' as Boyle well said, tis like the shot of a longbow, which owes its efficacy to the force of the
shooter; argument (i.e. circumstantial inference)
is like the shot of a cross-bow, equally forcible
whether discharged by a giant or a dwarf.' The
cross-bow notion of testimony-the notion that
one man's shot is as forceful as any other man'scan find no defenders to-day."
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And in vol. VII, sec. 2034, pp. 259 ff., Professor Wigmore
writes,
uThe common law, then, in repudiating the
numerical system, lays down four general principles:
(I) Credibility does not depend on numbers of witnesses. Therefore:
( 2) In general, the testimony of a single
witness, no matter what the issue or who the
person, may legally suffice as evidence upon
which the jury may found a verdict.
(3) Conversely, the mere assertion of any
witness does not of itself need to be believed,
even though he is unimpeached in any manner; because to require such belief would be
to give a quantitative and impersonal measure
to testimony.... "

These authorities find particular application to the present
case, wherein the trial judge was especially justified in discounting the testimony of Hazel Child, the embittered
former wife of respondent.
In its consideration of this case, we invite the particular attention of the Court to the following facts:
1. Respondent, not Eugene Child, initiated
efforts to purchase the property in about 1941 and
personally conducted negotiations and made his
offer.

2. Respondent alone, and not Eugene, conducted all negotiations for the property, both in
1941 and 1945.
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3. Hazel Child's testimony that the transaction was consummated through Mr. Toronto in
his office and that she paid the $275.00 to Mr.
Toronto on this occasion was completely impeached
by the independent testimony of Mr. Warnock.

4. Respondent took title to the property in
his own name, and the deed conveying title to
Eugene was only constructively delivered when
respondent recorded it on June 6, 1945.
5. Respondent immediately accepted th~ offer of the property by Mr. Warnock, for respondent himself, paying $25.00 down at the time
and the balance on receipt of the deed.

6. Respondent received the $275.00 from the
hands of Hazel Child only after he got out of the
car to go to Warnock's office, and then only after
she had again exacted his express promise to deed
the property to Eugene to secure the loan.
7. The loan was made before respondent executed the deed to Eugene Child, and no consideration passed at the time respondent executed the
deed as security nor thereafter.
8. It is more than a little absurd to think that
the respondent should try for a period of several
years to purchase the property in question and, as
soon as he was successful, immediately turn around
and sell it for $25.00 less than he paid for it; or to
think that he so diligently tried to purchase the
property for another.
9. It is not controverted that through all the
years since he acquired the property, the attitude
of the respondent toward it has remained constant
and unswerving. He wanted the property and he
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finally bought it. He has unfailingly and frequently claimed the property as his own, only to be rebuffed or met with silence on the part of his son.
At the time of the transaction, Eugene Child's
agent, Hazel Child, knew full well that the respondent considered the property his and gave the
deed only to secure the loan.
10. Eugene Child admitted in court that he
had never investigated the value of real property
anywhere at the time of the transaction, and had
never purchased any real property. He was 18
years old, away from home at the time, and did
not even know the location of the property. Respondent hardly need mention the strong improbability that appellant intended to ((invest"
therin, or to purchase it sight-unseen.
11. Respondent at the time did not have sufficient money to purchase the property, a goal of
long-standing interest. He acceded to the duress
imposed upon him by his wife to execute a deed
required as security for a loan which would allow
him to reach his goal, and he did so in good faith
and confidence in the members of his family. The
duress on respondent was real, and was admitted by
Hazel when she testified that she deliberately refused to surrender to respondent his water stock.
12. The evidence shows plainly that a sale of
the property would have deprived respondent of
his goal and was the last thing in his mind. The
situation shows a loan, with an absolute deed exacted under the duress of his financial situatiop. by
persons he trusted. Let the Court judge the good
faith of Hazel Child in this connection.
13. As to appellant Eugene Child, the entire
matter commenced in respondent's application for
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a loan, and nothing else. Respondent made no
offer at any time to sell the property, and appellants do not even claim he did. Respondent categorically insists that only a loan was consummated;
anything else would have defeated respondent's entire purpose.
14. Respondent has been in beneficial, open,
and notorious possession of the property ever since
he purchased it. He paid no rent of any kind.
Appellants did not object to respondent's use of
the land. Respondent, with his own labor and at
his sole expense, made the only improvement upon
the land. The only treatment of the property by
appellant was to commit waste thereupon and also
upon property t(B" over the express objections of
respondent.
IS. Respondent undeniably did not intend to
convey the beneficial interest in the property to
his son.
16. Appellant Eugene Child did not negotiate
for the land, did not know the owner's identity, and
was never considered by the sellers as the purchaser
of the land.
17. It is highly significant that appellant Eugene Child's only contact with the entire matter
was his response to respondent's application for a
loan.

Contrary to contentions of appellants, it was made
abundantly clear at the trial that respondent was never
called upon at the time of the divorce action initiated by
Hazel Child to list his property. Respondent asks appellants to explain to this Court why respondent should volunteer additional property at the time of the divorce in
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order to share it with Hazel Child, through whose mala
:fides respondent had parted with record title to said
property.
Hazel Child testified that Eugene told her before
going into the Navy not to loan respondent any money for
anything (Tr. 38). But independent testimony introduced after the trial by stipulation (R. 21) shows that
at the time Eugene is purported to have left this instruction relative to his bank account, he had a balance in said
account of $8.45. Eugene left for the service in June,
1944. It is doubtful that Eugene was this fearful about
his $8.45 bank balance. This indicates again the general
unreliability of Hazel Child's testimony in connection
with matters involving her former husband.
Appellants mention the testimony of Brandt Child
relative to a letter. Brandt admitted during the trial that
he had not read the letter he mentioned and had no knowledge of its contents. He only guessed or .. assumed" that
the date was April 16, 1945, and he admitted that he was
17 years of age at the time. There is nothing in his testimony connecting any letter he allegedly saw in the hand
of the respondent with a letter from Eugene to Hazel
Child concerning the property in question. Brandt's
recollection that Hazel Child suggested that respondent
sell his cows and buy the property with the proceeds does
not have the significance suggested by the appellants.
Rather, it only indicates again how obstinate was the fixation of his mother relative to those cows. Brandt admitted
in his testimony (Tr. 72) that cows was a tt • • • very, or
spoken, or mentioned thing," that his father and mother
had frequent arguments about the cows, and that his

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

20

mother had tried on several occasions to sell the cows.
In fact, the letter arrived authorizing the loan; but it was
still up to Hazel to go to the bank and withdraw the
money, and Hazel just seemingly could not rid her mind
of respondent's cows. She satisfied her insistence upon
dominance over her husband by requiring him to promise a deed absolute as security for the loan, or suggesting
to Eugene that he require said deed as security.
Appellants misrepresent the evidence beginning at the
bottom of page 31 of their brief, referring to the crossexamination of respondent. The respondent very clearly
and plainly testified that he was unable to relate the mention of selling cows by Hazel Child to the day on which
he paid the balance on the property (Tr. 23, 24). Further,
respondent testified that two cows would not have brought
enough money to purchase the property at that time. After
all, a rna jor reason respondent wanted the property was
for pasture in his effort to build up a dairy herd, and the
appellants find it difficult to understand why respondent
did not wa~t to sell the very cows with which he was
trying to build a dairy herd and for which he was buying
the property.
POINT III
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS THAT THE
AMOUNT OF THE LOAN WAS $275.00 FIND AMPLE SUPPORT IN THE EVIDENCE.

A.
Appellants object, in their point 3, to the findings and
conclusions that the amount of the loan to respondent
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was $275.00 rather than $300.00. Appellants suggest
that respondent adheres to the figure $275.00 because of
remarks during the course of the trial by the trial judge.
Unfortunately for this argument of appellants, it clearly
appears from the transcript that respondent testified that
he paid $25.00 down at the time he accepted Mr. Warnock's offer of the property, that the purchase price of the
property was $300.00, and that the balance due was
$275.00 (Tr. 11). The remarks of the trial judge mentioned by appellants occurred during the cross-examination of Hazel Child (Tr. 55) an hour or more later, and
after a recess (Tr. 32).
Appellants admit in their brief, p. 3 5, that if respondent received $275.00 of Eugene's money, this is
some evidence that Eugene was lending him enough to
enable him to pay the balance of the purchase price.
Respondent testified that the balance he owed on the
purchase price was $275.00 (Tr. 11) ; that he went to
Bountiful State Bank to borrow the $275.00 (Tr. 12);
that he asked his wife for his water stock so he could borrow $275.00 (Tr. 12); that he asked his wife for $275.00
from the joint bank account (Tr. 13) ; that he eventually
got the $275.00 from his wife (Tr. 14); and that he gave
this $275.00 to M.r. Warnock for the deed to the property
(Tr. 16). Respondent further, answering the trial judge,
testified that he did not receive back his down payment
of $25.00 (Tr. 55). Respondent submits that this is ample evidence to support the findings and conclusions that
the amount of the loan was $275.00.

It is interesting to note that Hazel Child's testimony
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that she paid this money to Mr. Toronto in Mr. Toronto's
office, complete with an account of what was said at the
time (Tr. 41, 42), was entirely and completely impeached
by the independent testimony of Mr. Warnock. Appellants remark that Hazel Child's testimony in this particular was uhazy." A careful perusal of Hazel Child's
testimony shows that it was cchazy" much of the time except when she thought something would be detrimental
to respondent, at which times she made sure that her
recollections were not uhazy"--even though imaginative.

B.
Appellants captiously object to the findings and conclusions that the amount of the loan was $275.00, rather
than $300.00 as mentioned in the complaint. Counsel for
appellants sufficiently brought out the reason for this
himself upon his examination of respondent during the
trial (Tr. 105), when the respondent freely admitted that
at the time depositions were taken in October, 1956, approximately eight months prior to the trial, he did not
remember whether he received $300.00 or $275.00 from
Hazel Child. It is obvious that respondent was reminded
of the $25.00 down payment he made when asked specifically (Tr. 11) whether or not anything was done to
bind the deal when he accepted Mr. Warnock's offer to
sell the property to respondent. It is clear, also, that this
accords with the view of the trial judge.
Appellants significantly make no claim nor attempt
any showing that this variance between the complaint
and the evidence has surprised or misled them in any way.
As to this variance, in addition to the above, respondent
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·relies upon the familiar rule that an immaterial variance,
with no showing of prejudice to the appellants' case, is
not reversible error. This rule is so ancient and wellknown that it needs no citation of authority.
Further, respondent relies upon the equally familiar
rule that an appellate court will not reverse where an appellant raises a question for the first time on appeal that
should have been presented to the trial court, particularly
in the absence of any showing of prejudice to the appellant's case. Appellants should have objected below to the
introduction of evidence showing the amount of the loan
as $275.00 rather than $300.00, in order that respondent
could move to amend the complaint to conform to the
evidence. In fact, counsel for appellants elicited some
of the evidence himself to which he now objects (Tr. 108).
In addition, it is submitted that appellants should have
submitted this matter to the trial court under Rule 52
(b), U.R.C.P. Appellants failed to take these steps below,
and their present objections come too late.

POINT IV
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW THAT THERE WAS
A BREACH OF A CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN RESPONDENT AND HAZEL AND EUGENE CHILD ARE WITHIN THE ISSUES AND ARE
ADEQUATELY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
Appellants first complain that there is no allegation
in the complaint of a confidential relationship. Appellants, however, fail to allege or make any showing at all
that they were surprised, misled, or prejudiced in any way
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because confidential relationship of the parties was not
specifically pleaded. On the contrary, all the evidence
shows that appellants were fully apprised concerning the
case and its ramifications at the trial. This complaint is
therefore without merit.
The burden of appellants' argument that the facts
do not show the existence of a confidential relation is to
the effect that neither Hazel nor Eugene had confidence
in respondent. Respondent wishes to point out that this
argument is immaterial, for it was the confidence respondent had in Hazel and Eugene Child that was
breached. It is sufficient that the confidence goes from
the one•who trusts to the ones who breach; it is not required that those who breach have confidence also in the
one who trusts.
Respondent states in his testimony that he had confidence in Hazel (Tr. 15), for he said that he did not
think she would deliver to him any different sum from that
he requested. He accepted and relied fully upon her
representations that Eugene would grant the loan on
condition that Eugene have record title as security. On
her representations, respondent was induced to part with
record title; and this alone is sufficient to show respondent's
trust and confidence in his wife and son. That Hazel in
turn had confidence in him is shown by the fact that she
delivered over the money upon his oral promise to deed
to Eugene as security.
That respondent had confidence in Eugene is shown
by evidence that he loaned Eugene and Brandt $1200.00
without security and after the transaction here in question (Tr. 28, 31, 103, 104), as well as by the fact that he
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willingly conveyed title to Eugene for security as he
promised to do. As noted above, Hazel's testimony that
Eugen~ told her before leaving for the Navy not to loan
any of his money to his father (Tr. 38) is shown to be
most highly improbable by the stipulated evidence (R. 21)
showing that at the time Eugene had only about $8.45 in
the joint account with his mother. Also, Eugene himself
testified that he and his father were on good terms in 1945
(Tr. 98), and that he and his father trust one another
(Tr. 104).
This Court, in Perry v. McConkJe (1953), I U.2d
189, 264 P.2d 852, 854, states that where a fiduciary relationship exists, because of the kinship of the parties, the
fiduciary has the burden of proving that his dealings with
the beneficiary are fair and in good faith. In that case,
there appears to be far less evidence of confidence placed
by the sister in her brothers than there is evidence of misplaced confidence in the present case. This Court also
found confidential family relationships in Anderson v.
Cercone (1919), 54 U. 345, 180 P. 586; Haws v. Jensen
(1949), 116 U. 212, 209 P.2d 229; and Hawkins v. Perry
(1953), 123 U. 16, 253 P.2d 372.
POINT V
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW NO. 6 AND NO. 7 ARE
WITHIN THE ISSUES OF THE CASE AND ARE
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
Appellants complain that Conclusions of Law No. 6
and No. 7 are not within the issues of the case and are
contrary to the evidence. Their argument states that the
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subject-matter of these conclusions (unjust enrichment
and constructive fraud) is not expressly mentioned in the
complaint, and their sole comment about the evidence
relative to these matters is confined to unjust enrichment.
The allegations of the complaint are in essence that
respondent borrowed money from Eugene Child through
his mother, Hazel Child, to purchase certain property;
that he purchased this property and thereafter placed
title thereto in the name of Eugene as security; that respondent received the money only as a loan; that respondent
did not intend to part with beneficial ownership of the
land; that all parties to the transaction intended the deed
to be a mortgage; in the alternative that Eugene Child,
knowing the mind and intentions of respondent, did not
intend to hold the property for the benefit of respondent
and return title to him; and that appellants wrongfully
refused to reconvey to respondent upon demand and offer
of repayment. These allegations adequately present the
factual situation which was the basis of the action and
sufficiently raise as issues the relationship of the various
persons named and their actions with respect to the transaction, as well as the question whether or not Eugene
lawfully held the property in question. The actions of
the parties being in issue, their constructively fraudulent
actions must necessarily be also. The issue whether or
not Eugene lawfully held the property certainly included
reasons at law why he did not lawfully so hold, including
unjust enrichment.
There is no complaint or showing by appellants that
they were misled in any way by the complaint. On the
contrary, a reading of the transcript shows that both
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sides were fully apprised of the situation giving rise to the
action; and it affirmatively appears in the transcript that
appellants took the deposition of respondent prior to
the trial, at which time they of course had full opportunity
to explore and develop respondent's facts. The record
is devoid of a motion for a more definite statement; therefore it is plain that appellants did not need one, being fully
apprised.
Rebutting appellants' comments on the evidence relative to unjust enrichment, the Restatement of Restitution,
Sec. 160, comment d, points out that restitution is made
in such cases to u • • • restore to the plaintiff property of
which he has been unjustly deprived and to take from the
defendant property the retention of which by him would
result in a corresponding unjust enrichment of the defendant; in other words the effect is to prevent a loss to
the plaintiff and a corresponding gain to the defendant,
and to put each of them in the position in which he was
before the defendant acquired the property." Appellanes do not deny that it was respondent who wanted to
buy the property, sought out the owner, investigated its
value, negotiated for its purchase over a period of four
years, and finally purchased it; who built with his own
labor and paid for a substantial fence around the property;
who has continuously and without objection used and occupied the property ever since he bought it; and who has
continuously and without exception claimed the property
as his own ever since.
Respondent testified, and the trial court found, that
he delayed his application to the courts for redress in an
unsuccessful attempt to preserve his family unity and
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harmony. But he immediately applied to the courts when
his family was disrupted by divorce at the instance of his
wife, Hazel, and when he learned of acts by Eugene Child
derogatory to respondent's beneficial ownership of the
property (Tr. 116, 117). He patiently tried for all the
intervening years to talk to Eugene, hoping to persuade
him to reconvey the property amicably, but Eugene refused to talk with him about it. Throughout, respondent's
interest has been to develop a dairy herd for the benefit
of the family.
In contrast, what of Eugene? Eugene Child had no
interest in nor knowledge of the property or its value. He
did not search out the owner and try to buy it. He did not
negotiate for its purchase. His sole contact therewith was
his response to his father's application to him for a loan.
He knew no reason at the trial why his father should give
him any preference to the property over the other children in the family. He did not develop the property,
nor use it except to commit waste by removal of soil. He
simply returned home from the service and found himself, because of the wrong either of Hazel alone or of
Hazel and Eugene jointly, the record owner of a large
tract of land. It is safe to conclude that Eugene's determination not to reconvey was in direct proportion to
the rising value of the property. The lower court properly
concluded that Eugene would be unjustly enriched were
he allowed to retain the property.
POINT VI
RESPONDENT'S RECOVERY IS NOT BARRED
BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS NOR BY
LACHES.
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Appellants invoke the doctrine of laches, and in answer thereto respondent invites the attention of the court
to the fact that respondent has been in possession of the
property in question, enjoying the full beneficial use thereof, ever since he purchased it. It was established at the
trial that record title to realty in the Child family frequently reposed in another than the true owner. Specifically, title to property ((B" was in respondent's sister
Martha for many years as security for a loan, and then
(through Hazel's alteration of a deed) went to Hazel, respondent's wife, even though respondent purchased and
actually owned said property. As long as respondent had
the possession and beneficial use of property ((A," and
while he still had hopes of maintaining family unity and
harmony, he cannot be said to have been under an equitable obligation to throw the fat into the fire by instigating
litigation against his son. It most surely cannot be said
to be the policy of the law in such a situation to avoid
patient attempts at peaceful persuasion and to stir up
intra-family strife by requiring a precipitate lawsuit.
Surely equity will look with sympathy upon respondent's
earnest and patient efforts to accomplish justice within
his family in peace and harmony and without recourse
except as a last alternative to the shame and disruption of
a public trial at law. The transcript and findings show
that respondent delayed pursuing his remedy at law because: he was in peaceful and beneficial possession of the
property; he had hopes that eventually Eugene would
discuss the question with him and be persuaded to reconvey to the true owner; respondent and Eugene were in the
confidential relationship of father and son, with respondent
loaning Eugene and his brother money (Tr. 28) without
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security and conveying land from property uB" to Eugene for his residence without charge (Tr. 29, 30, 43);
and he did not want to destroy his family by the open
conflict of a lawsuit (Tr. 34, 35). This is sufficient justification for the delay in bringing this suit.
Unreasonable delay alone, moreover, is not sufficient
reason for finding laches. Restatement of Restitution,
Sec. 148 and comments. There must also be such a material and innocent change of position by the other party
that restitution would work injustice or an inequitable
hardship upon him. In the present case, appellants knew
ever since Eugene returned from the service in 1946 that
respondent claimed ownership of the property; thus any
change of position by appellants was not innocent. Further,
appellants have made no showing of any kind of any
detrimental reliance upon respondent's delay. Appellants
show no damage, no hardship, no assumption of ris~ or
responsibility with respect to the property. They fail to
show in any regard wherein the present judgment against
them is a greater disadvantage or hardship than the same
judgment would have been five or ten years ago. Absent
such a showing, a court cannot properly apply the doctrine
of laches.
Appellants' comments relative to risk, responsibility,
and fruition of faith, against the background of the present situation, go beyond the point of argument and assume proportions of the ludicrous. Appellants cannot
point to a single element of risk, responsibility, or faith
on the part of Eugene relative to this property, save, perhaps, for the payment of less than $20.00 per year in
taxes. (That payment of taxes are not controlling, see
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Christensen v. Williams (1908), 34 U. 127, 97 P. 219.)
The only faith and responsibility exercised as to this
property have been respondent's-and undeniably his has
been all the risk, with record title in another. Relative to
appellants' argument as to change in value of the property,
it is interesting to note that the tax records in evidence
show that the valuation for tax purposes, and presumably
market value, did not rise until 1955 or 1956.
As to laches, as said by the court in Berniker v. Berniker (1947), 30 Cal.2d 439, 182 P.2d 557, 563,

((Nor is the defense of laches available here, for
it is plain that no legal prejudice was caused to appellant by reason of the delay in making a demand
nor by reason of the nonenforcement of the trust .
. . . Moreover, the facts and circumstances of this
case suggest other grounds for the rejection of
the doctrine of laches: It is not applied strictly
between near relatives ... it is of little significance
in the case of a resulting trust ... and ((it) is not
designed to punish a plaintiff' but is (invoked where
a refusal would be to permit an unwarranted injustice.' . . . (it is never permitted to be invoked
merely to aid a faithless trustee in consummating
his wrong.':)'
As to appellants' contentions relative to the statute
of limitations, it does not appear that the Davidson case,
cited by appellants on p. 41 of their brief, is in point, for
the respondent here is in possession of the property. Respondent points to the evidence and findings that respondent enjoyed full possession and use of the property
from the time he purchased it until the time of the suit.
In the Berniker case, cited above, the court said on this
point, p. 563, Pacific:
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u • • • The statute of limitations never runs in
favor of a trustee as against the beneficiary while the
latter is in possession of the property. (citing
cases)"

Also in this regard see Anderson v. Cercone (1919), 54 U.
345, 180 P. 586, where this Court expressly states that
joint possession by the beneficiary of such a trust tolls the
statute of limitations by the express terms thereof.

CONCLUSION
The evidence is wholly sufficient to sustain the judgment of the trial court. The evidence alone that the
property in question was purchased in the first instance
by respondent is sufficient to sustain the judgment under
Christensen v. Williams (1908), 34 U. 127, 97 P. 219,
cited above.
To deprive respondent in his old age of the benefits
of his initiative and judgment in purchasing the property
after prolonged interest therein would be a most grave
miscarriage of justice.
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

WOODRUFF C. GWYNN and
CHILD & SPAFFORD
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attortteys for Respondent
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